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THE MEANINGFULNESS OF A MISPRICED
OPTION: A TEST OF THE
BLACK-SCHOLES MODEL
Ladd Michael Kochman
Uday S. Tate
INTRODUCTION
If the proof of the pudding is in the eating, then the usefulness of a
security-pricing model can be judged by the returns earned by using the model.
Based on that measure , the Black-Scholes model fulfills its promise to establish a call option's equilibrium, or correct, price. Black and Scholes ( 1972),
Galai (I 977), Trippi (1977), Chiras and Manaster ( 1978) and Koch man and
Badarinathi (1981) found that above-average returns are possible where option trading decisions are guided by the Black-Scholes model. However, the
absence of excess profits may not necessarily imply an incomplete model.
In the case of the 8-S model, a poor estimate of a stock's variance (as an
input into the model) or a bull (bear) market when short (long) calls
predominate one's holdings could also account for disappointing results.
While variance estimates are growing more sophisticated and hedging options with stock or other options offers some protection from the vagaries
of the equity market, abnormal returns remain a tenuous condition for model
completeness. Figure I depicts the testing procedure.
An easier and more accurate test of the Black-Scholes model would be
to {I) buy (sell) calls which are trading below (above) their respective B-S
model prices and (2) distinguish among those calls on the basis of the percentmispriced ratio.

(I)

Percent-mispriced ratio

=

Market price - Model price
Model price

If we assume that a ten-percent ratio establishes a minimally acceptable level
of mispricing (to defray transaction costs) and that a twenty-percent ratio
a_p~roaches a realistic ma.ximum, we could construct three portfolios cons,s!mg of call options 10-14.9 percent, 15-19.9 percent and 20+ percent mispnced. To the extent that the more out-of-line options produce the higher
returns, we could infer that the percent-mispriced ratio is a meaningful meas~re and, more fundamentally, that the Black-Scholes pricing model can identify exploitable mispricing.
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FIGURE I
Usefulness of the Black-Scholes
Model as Implied by Option Returns
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METHODOLOGY
A better procedure for testing the effectiveness of the Black-Scholes
model is diagrammed in Figure 2. Mispriced calls are collected in one of three
different portfolios based on their respective percent-mispriced ra~ios. 1:he
source for those ratios was the 48 weekly issues of Standard and Poor s Option
Guide - published April 1977 into March 1978. The decision to use the life
of the Option Guide as the measurement period for this study was influenced
nol only by the obvious accessibility of percent-mispriced ratios but also by
1he seeming logic that given the availability of the S&P publication, the option
market would tend to be more efficient and thus result in a stiffer test of
our evaluative technique.
All calls trading below (above) their respective model prices by a margin of at least 10 percent were purchased (sold) and assigned to the appropriate
portfolio on the basis of that margin. Portfolio X would consist of calls which
are l0.0 to 14.9 percent mispriced; calls 15.0 to 19.9 percent and 20+ percent out-of-line would constitute portfolios Y and
respectively.
A second condition for acceptability is a minimum market price of $300.
A $100 option which is 20 percent out-of-line would be no better than a $400
option five percent out-of-line in terms of generating a dollar return (i.e.,
price correction) in excess of transaction costs. While $300 is a somewhat
arbitrary specification, Kochman and Badarinathi (1981) showed that a price
constraint of $300 + strikes a balance between safety and restrictiveness.
All option positions were taken Monday morning and closed out the
following Friday afternoon. Returns on long calls were calculated per Equation (2). Returns on short calls were based on Equation (3). Individual

z.

(2)

Percent return L
where:

(3)

P,
Po

=

P , - Po

week-ending call price
week-beginning call price

Percent return S

=

Po - P

option returns would be summed within each portfolio and then divided by
th e number of options in the portfolio to achieve an average portfolio return .
. We would expect Portfolio Y (15.0 to 19.9 percent mispriced) to have
a ~•gher average rate of return than portfolio X (10.0 to 14.9 percent mispnced) and, in turn, portfolio Z (20+ percent mispriced) to have a higher
averag~ retur_n than portfolio Y. Factors affecting those returns such as general Pnce swings and variance estimates of the underlying stocks - which
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FIGURE 2
Ratio Test of the Black-Scholes Model
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have hampered past attempts to assess the usefulness of the Black-Scholes
model_ should exert an even influence over our three portfolios and leave
our imagined hierarchy of portfolio returns intact.
RESULTS
For the period April 8, 1977 to March 10, 1978 there were 723 listed
call options (I) at least 10 percent out-of-line with their respective model prices
and (2) selling for no less than $300. Forty-six percent (or 334) of those calls
were 10.0 to 14.9 percent mispriced; 29 percent (or 208) were 15.0 to 19.9
percent mispriced while 25 percent (or 181) were 20+ percent mispriced. Table
I exhibits those totals as well as the average portfolio returns and standard
deviations.
To determine whether there were significant differences among those
average portfolio returns {X=9. 16 percent, Y~ 12.26 percent, Z= 19.63 percent), t-tests were performed using the Statistical Analysis System (SAS).
Options which were 20.0+ percent mispr iced {Z) significantly outperformed
options 15.0-19.9 percent (Y) and 10.0-1 4.9 percent tX) out-o f-line. There
was no significant difference between the average returns from portfolios
X and Y. Table 2 reports the SAS results.

TABLE l
Average Portfolio Returns
as a Function of Degree of Mispricing
PERCENTMISPRICED
PORTFOLIO RATIO

NO.
CALLS

AVERAGE
RATE OF
RETURN

STANDARD
DEVIATIO '
24.391110

X

10.0-14.9

334

9. 1611"0

y

15.0-19.9

208

12.2611"0

27.441110

20.0+

181

19.6311"0

28.1611"0

z
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TABLE 2

A Summary of Univariate t-test Results
ull
hypothesis

t-,·alue

df

Rx= Ry

-1.33 I

401

Accept Hoa

Rx= Rz

-4.214

328

Reject H 0 b

Ry= Rz

2.611

387

Reject H.C

-

-

Inference

a o

.05; t-test formula for unequal but unknown variances was used.

b o

= .01; t-test formula for unequal but unknown variances was used.

C

O

.01; I-test formula for equal but unknown variances was used.

A second measure of relative performance is the ratio of profitable-tolosing trades within each port folio for the April 1977-March 1978 period.
For the least out-of-line options (X), the ratio of winners to losers was 1.8:1.
For the most mispriced options (Z), the ratio was 3.9: I. For the middle group
of options (Y), the winners-to-losers ratio was I.7: I. Returns on options which
experienced no price changes - i.e., zero-percent changes - were treated
as losing trades. Figure 3 separately graphs the components of those ratios
in percentage form.
Although transaction costs are not considered in this study since they
should not affect our portfolios in an uneven way, it would be useful to redefine losing trades as those failing to hurdle an imagined commission charge
of eight percent' and then 10 recalculate the winners-to-losers ratios for the
three portfolios. For the least out-of-line options, the adjusted ratio was 1.0:1.
For the most out-of-line options, the adjusted ratio was 2.6: I. For the middle group, the new ratio was 1.0: I . Figure 4 portrays the underlying percentages.

CONCLUSIONS
When apparent mispricing fails to lead to abnormal returns, it is nat·
ural to question whether mispricing was ever present to any significant degree.
More basically, the completeness of the pricing model would be suspect.
However, poor model inputs, an equity market moving counter to the
predominant portfolio position and even excessive transaction costs could
negate an effective model.
An alternative measure of pricing effectiveness is the integrity of the
distinctions the underlying model draws between fairly priced and mispriced
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FIGURE 3
Percent of Profitable Trades
Versus Percent of Losing Trades
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FIGURE 4

Percent of Profitable Trades
Versus Percent of Losing Trades
with Transaction Costs
Portfolio X:

Portfolio Y:

Portfolio Z:
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·t·es as well as between securities mispriced and more mispriced. For
secun 1
•
d h d" · ·
the Black-Scholes model, the securities are call options an t e 1st10ct1o~s
(for this study) are 10-14. 9 percent, I S-19. 9 percent and 20 + percent m1spriced.

.

.

lt is clear that persistent and sizable differences between model and mar-

ket prices of listed calls existed during the period of time c_o vered by th(s
study. Since the calls in our data set (723) had to satisfy m101mum conditions of being ten percent out-of-line and trading for $300, the full extent
of apparent mispricing among all calls trading on organized exchanges between April I 977 and March 1978 would seem to suggest a near disregard
for B-S prices.
What encourages us to believe that B-S prices are influential among option market participants is the clear decline in the number of $300+ calls
as the percent-mispriced ratio was first extended beyond 14.9 percent and
then again beyond 19.9 percent. During our measurement period there were
334 call options which were 10 to 14.9 percent out-of-line with their respective B-S prices. Between IS and 19.9 percent there were 208 calls. Calls no
less than 20 percent mispriced totalled 181. While the shrinking totals do
suggest a certain respect for the B-S model price, they (totals) seem close
enough to allow interportfolio comparisons.
Portfolio X - 10 to 14.9 percent mispriced - returned 9.16 percent
per call. Portfolio Y - IS to 19. 9 percent mispriced - earned 12.26 percent
per call. Portfolio Z - 20 percent or more mispriced - averaged 19.63 percent. Only the difference between the average returns from portfolios X and
Y proved to be insignificant. Portfolio Z significantly outperformed portfolios X and Y at the p= .01 level. Any notion that options !iade far out-ofline for valid reasons - much like a stock with a conspicuously low priceearnings multiple - is clearly rejected by the evidence.
All three portfolios experienced a greater number of profitable trades
than losing trades. Where transaction costs were not considered, portfolio
X registered profits in 64.2 percent of its trades. Portfolio Y profited from
63.0 percent of its trades while portfolio Z enjoyed a 79.6 percent success
rate. Where transaction costs were imagined to represent 8 percent of the
value of the trade, portfolios X and Y could do no better than a 50-50 split
between profitable and losing trades. Portfolio Z was less affected by the
imposition of commissions as it was still able to record profits in 71.8 percent of its trades.
The failure of portfolio Y to produce a higher profitable-to-losing-trades
ratio than portfolio X (the least out-of-line calls) coupled with the insignificance of the difference between the average returns for the two portfolios
w~ul~ seem to imply that the distinction between options 10-14.9 percent
~mspnced and 15-19.9 percent mispriced is not a meaningful one. The only
important distinctions may be 10 percent mispriced (to cover transaction costs)
and 20 percent mispriced (to ensure some regularity of profitable trades).
In summary, the expression "more mispriced" seems to be meaningful
where the price standard is established by the Black-Scholes model. The
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contribution of this study to the option literature lies not so much in the discovery of the usefulness of the B-S pricing model but rather in the testing
procedure which frees the researcher from having to contend with variance
estimates, risk-equivalent rates of return, hedging strategies and transaction
costs. Implications contained in this study regarding the efficiency of the
options market seem inescapable; however, since the efficacy of the BlackScholes model can be judged independent of the size of the returns consequent to the use of the model, no explicit attempt was made to characterize
the efficiency of option prices.

Footnotes
' Based on a round-turn commission of $50 (Tradex Brokerage Service)
"divided by" an average transaction of $625.
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